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5 SUMMARY CHAPTER AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
1.  This  paper  describes  the  UK switch  to  a  decimal  currency,  the  organizational, 
legislative  and  other  practical  arrangements  for  it,  and  makes  comparisons  with  the 
changeover to a single European currency. 
The UK operation affected only one country and was on a much smaller scale than the 
European one.  Changeover problems and the available solutions to them have altered 
since 1971  and the arrangements made in the UK reflected the administrative traditions 
of that country and the experience of other Commonwealth countries which had earlier 
adopted decimal systems. To describe what the UK did is not to suggest that the same 
pattern should be followed in the European Union. 
2.  Nevertheless,  UK experience may be valuable because many of the  issues will  be 
similar.  There will be a big physical task of producing and distributing bank notes and 
coins (likely to be the critical path in determining the length of a preparatory period and 
only able to begin when the names of currency units, the specifications and designs of 
the notes and coins have been  agreed).  Many machines which  record  money or are 
operated by coins, bank notes or cards will have to be converted. 
There  will  be  a  massive  computer  reprogramming  exercise.  Complex  legislative 
provisions  will  be  needed.  All  organizations  will  have  to  modify  their  accountancy 
systems and their pricing of goods and services and to devote resources to staff training. 
The conduct of cash transactions. in shops will need careful analysis. Conversion tables 
will be needed in all countries and their use both in  practice and in  law will have to be 
resolved.  Organizations large and  small  will  have to  be  stimulated tq  inv~stigate and 
resolve their own problems in a timely and cost-effective way. 
There will have to be carefully judged publicity campaigns for large and.small traders, ...the 
general public and schools. There will be concern by the public,  consumer groups and 
their elected representatives about the possible effect on prices. 
7 The key role of the banks will call for special attention. Close, open collaboration will be 
desirable amongst Ministries of Finance,  any  special  bodies set up to co-ordinate the 
changeover, the banks, the producers of bank notes and coins and trade associations of 
all kinds. 
The UK faced all those issues and it would be  surprising therefore if British experience 
were not relevant. 
THE NATURE OF THE UK CHANGEOVER 
3.  The UK Government's decision to decimalise in 1971  was announced in March 1966-
almost five years in advance of what later became known as D Day (for Decimal Day), 
15th February 1971. 
Further details were given in December of the same year by which time most aspects of 
the Government's intended system were known.  The old pounds/shillings/pence system 
(£sd) with 20 shillings in the pound and 12 pence in each shilling would be replaced by a 
decimal pound/pence system (£p) with 100 new pence in the unchanged pound sterling 
and a halfpenny as the lowest value coin in circulation. (The new penny would be worth 
almost two and a half tiry1es the old one). 
This system followed the majority recommendation of a Committee of Inquiry under the 
chairmanship of Lord Halsbury which had consulted widely for over one and a half years. 
The  values  and  specifications  of  five  of  the  six  decimal  coins  were  known.  The 
specification of the sixth coin (50 pence) was announced in 1969. 
There would  be  a changeover period  after D Day when  both old  and  new currencies 
would  be  legal tender but one  of the tasks  of the  Decimal  Currency  Board,  set up to 
facilitate  the  transition,  would  be  to  keep  this  awkward  period  as  short  as  possible, 
making full use of the preparatory period. 
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THE COINAGE BEFORE AND AFTER DECIMALISATION 
4.  Table  1  lists  the  £sd  coins  circulating  in  1966 and  the  new decimal  £p  coins.  In 
summary,  two  coins  were  demonetised  well  before  D  Day;  Sp  and  1  Op  coins  with 
identical  values  and  specifications to those  of the old  shilling  and  two  shilling  pieces 
gradually replaced those coins from early 1968; a SOp coin with identical value replaced 
the £sd ten-shilling bank note in 1969. 
Only three new coins - 1/2p, 1  p and 2p became legal tender on  D Day although people 
were already familiar with them through training programs and presentation packs as well 
as publicity material. 
Two £sd coins (the old penny and a threepenny piece) were demonetised at the end of 
the changeover period.  One - the £sd  sixpence - remained  legal tender until  1980 but 
despite its popularity in the £sd system declined rapidly in use from  D Day.  The pound 
sterling was unchanged. 
SOME  COMPARISONS  BETWEEN THE UK CHANGEOVER AND  THE  MOVE  TO A 
SINGLE CURRENCY 
5. Several comparisons are important: 
(i) The UK had to learn to count money decimally (i.e. in terms of multiples of ten) instead 
of - for small  sums - a mixture of twelves and  twenties  and  tens.  All  members  of the 
European Union count money decimally. 
(ii)  There were  nevertheless  close  links  between  the  old  and  new systems  and  their 
coinages so it was possible to introduce the new coins gradually and to operate a system 
of dual currency working during the changeover period which minimized problems. 
In the European Union all bank notes and coins will be changed, the values of the new in 
relation to the old will not be easily memorized and cash handling will be more difficult in 
the changeover period. 
(iii)  The  need  to  convert  or replace  many  thousands  of mechanically  operated  cash 
registers  in  shops,  as well  as  other machines  which  recorded  non-decimally and  slot 
machines, tended to dominate UK planning as it had in other Commonwealth countries. 
9 In the European Union the machine problems,  though formidable, will be very different. 
All  cash  registers  record  decimally but  bank  and  other machines  operated  by plastic 
cards are a special problem. 
(iv) There was by 1966 little or no objection to currency decimalisation in UK. There had 
been  strong  differences  of opinion  on  which  system  to  adopt  (the  one  based  on  the 
pound or one based on a new unit worth ten shillings/SOp as in  South Africa,  Australia 
and New Zealand) but once Parliament had endorsed the Government's decision for the 
pound system there was general readiness to co-operate in making plans for a quick and 
smooth transition. 
General attitudes in the European Union may be different and less welcoming. 
(v)  By mid-1967 (three and a half years before D Day) when the UK Parliament agreed 
the  pound  system  and  the  supporting  coinage,  almost  all  significant  elements  in  the 
system were known and remained unchanged. This provided a firm and necessary basis 
for planning and the commitment of expenditure. 
The European Union is a long way from this planning certainty:  the name of the minor 
(and major?)  unit of currency,  the denominations and specifications of bank notes and 
coins,  the general pattern of the changeover and the organizational and accountability 
arrangements for it remain to be agreed, and some aspects will be controversial. 
THE CHANGEOVER PERIOD 
6.  Originally a changeover period of as long as one and a half years seemed possible in 
the UK but the Decimal Currency Board,  charged to keep it short,  became increasingly 
convinced on the basis of consultations that it would be very short. 
The length (as in other Commonwealth countries) was not fixed in advance of D Day. 
Although  it was not legally ended for six months,  for all  practical purposes it was over 
much more quickly. The Fourth Annual Report of the Decimal Currency Board states that 
by Friday 19 February (5 days after D Day) "the UK was already, for practical purposes, 
a decimal country". The UK came close to a "big bang" changeover. 
10 Table 1 
BANK NOTES AND COINS IN USE IN BRITAIN BEFORE AND AFTER D DAY 
£sd system (1966) 
(  12 pence = one shilling 
20 shillings= £1) 
£1  bank note 
1  0 shilling bank note 
2 shillings and sixpence 
(half crown)! 
(not a sensible coin) 
2 shilling coin 
1 shilling coin 
sixpence (6d) 
threepence (3d) 
penny (1d) 
halfpenny (usefulness eroded 
by inflation) 
NOTES 
no change 
equal to 
equal to 
equal to 
equal to 
no exact equivalent 
no exact equivalent 
£p system (1971) 
(100 new pence= £1) 
£1  bank note 
SOp coin 
10p coin 
5p coin 
(two and a half pence) 
2p (4.8 old pence) 
01p (2.4 old pence) 
0(  1.2 old pence) 
(1) The 50p coin was introduced in 1969 in place of a 10 shilling bank note and was used as a 10 shilling coin until D 
Day. 
(2) The 1  Op  and 5p coins were introduced in 1968 and used as 2 shilling and  1 shilling coins until D Day alongside 
the £sd coins from which they differed only in the designs on them. 2 shilling and shilling coins continued after D Day 
as 1  Op and 5p coins. 
(3) The popular £sd sixpence was worth exactly two and a half new pence and was used as a coin of that value from 
D Day,  but no decimal coin was issued and,  as an awkward decimal value, the old coin rapidly declined in use from 
D Day.  It was not demonetised until1980. 
(4) Coins below "sixpence" (two and a half new pence) had no equivalents in the other system. The 3d and ld were 
demonetised after the changeover period. The 2p,  lp and halfpenny were the only unfamiliar coins introduced on  D 
Day. 
(5) The £sd "half-crown" and halfpenny were not needed in the decimal system and were demonetised in 1969. 
(6) Since decimalisation, further changes have been made-. a £1  coin has replaced the bank note;  a 20p coin  has 
been introduced; the 5p and 1  Op coins have been reduced in size; and the new halfpenny has been demonetised. 
lThe  crown  (five  shillings)  was  not  in  day  to  day  use,  being  by  then  largely  a 
commemorative  coin.  Interestingly  it  started  in the  16th  century  as  a  gold  coin  - an 
11 The banks changed to decimal working on  D Day and from  then  onwards all  cheques 
had to be in the new system.  Government departments and the Post Office did the same 
as did big business organizations. Given this powerful stimulus other organizations saw 
little advantage in holding back. 
Practical  and  commercial  pressures  pointed  to  a  quick  change.  Once  "monnaie 
scripturale" was decimal, "monnaie fiduciaire" followed quickly. 
7.  It is not easy to see how a changeover period can be avoided in the European Union, 
despite its problems, and to attempt to fix its length in advance would be risky. 
Many machines and other devices will have to operate in "old money" until the equivalent 
of D Day and they cannot all  be  changed overnight.  For reasons  good  or bad  not all 
smaller businesses will be fully prepared and both they and members of the public will 
have large amounts of old money which they must be allowed to spend. 
The length of the period will be determined by the rate at which  businesses large and 
small choose to change. 
When people are paid in the new money and are given change in  new money as they 
visit  shops  where  prices  are  in  new money,  they  will  not  draw old  money from  their 
banks.  Banks cannot refuse new money to businesses and the public as soon as they 
want it. 
Sensible use of a long preparatory period,  stimulated by careful publicity, will gradually 
make  realistic  forecasts  possible  but  there  will  always  be  some  uncertainty.  A  safe 
assumption is that the longer the preparatory period is the shorter the changeover period 
will be. 
ALTERNATIVE CHANGEOVER PATTERNS 
8.  The  changeover  pattern  adopted  in  UK  and  other  Commonwealth  countries  - a 
preparatory period, a D Day and a changeover period of dual currency working - is  not 
necessarily the only one. 
adaption of the French ecu a Ia couronne. 
12 It  has  been  suggested  that,  because  of the  difficulties  of dual-currency working  in  a 
gradual changeover,  it might be preferable to plan for two quick changeovers separated 
in  time:  the  first  for  'monnaie  scripturale'  (in  effect  accounting  and  inter-bank 
transactions) and the second for 'monnaie fiduciare' (cash transactions). 
9.  Apart from  reducing  the  adverse  effect  of dual-currency  working,  this  changeover 
pattern would permit an early start to be  made for monnaie scriptuale operations; there 
would  be no need to wait for the production and distribution of bank notes and coins. 
Another argument for the separation between monnaie scripturale and monnaie fiduciare 
is  that the  first big  bang  would  help  in  the  educational  and  publicity program  for the 
second one.  Planners and trainers could concentrate their efforts on each changeover in 
turn instead of having to do everything at once. 
1  0.  The  double  big  bang  pattern,  despite  its  attractions,  would  impose  difficulties  on 
banks  and  businesses  - largely  because  the  separation  of monnaie  scripturale  and 
monnaie fiduciare cannot be complete. 
For some  organizations accounting  and  book-keeping  in  one currency and  dealing  in 
cash  in  another  will  not  be  easy.  Some  might  prefer  a  simultaneous  changeover. 
Additional transitional work will be necessary. 
For example,  if people and small traders are allowed to continue writing cheques in old 
money they wi II wish to receive bank statements which give not only the total balance but 
also individual items in that statement in old money - or in both old and new.  The same 
will be true of bills from suppliers of goods and services. 
Statements  of  salaries  and  wages,  social  security  payments  and  pensions  will 
presumably have to be in old money- or old and new- so long as goods and services 
are priced in old money. Apart from the additional accounting work of giving two amounts 
(in accordance with an  official or even statutory conversion table ) some organizations 
may argue that until they can  re-think their selling prices in  neat,  attractive new money 
terms then they are not making the most of the single currency. 
And so  long as they are trading in old money,  traders will wish to  submit tax,  VAT and 
other necessary monetary information to Government in  old money -thus necessitating 
conversion work - and a possible source of mistakes and complaints. 
13 permissible  seems  sensible  but  to  oblige  people  to  take  it  would  pose  unacceptable 
problems.  People tend to think of money in  terms of the familiar bank notes and coins 
they use everyday. There would be  problems in  educating them  to translate their daily 
transactions into a different form. 
12.  The Interim Report of the Expert Group on the Changeover to the Single Currency, 
published  in  January 1995,  presents the  practical  and  operational  problems  of a two-
stage introduction of the ecu.  The proposal is to confine the first step to  a changeover 
for the  monetary and  banking  sector whilst  leaving  relations  with  customers,  whether 
business or private to remain in "old money". This seems wise, despite the heavy volume 
of conversion work for banks and the risk of disputes with  customers.  There would,  of 
course,  be  legal difficulties.  Companies could,  if they wished,  opt to  deal with banks  in 
ecu but their dealings with customers would still be in old money. 
HOW COMMON MUST THE COMMON CURRENCY BE? 
13.  In  the  UK  it  was  always  clear  that  whatever  decimal  system  was  agreed  by 
Parliament must be  exactly the same  throughout the  United Kingdom.  In  the  European 
Union there is still room for debate about the extent to which national variations might be 
desirable  particularly  perhaps  in  the  names  and  designs  of  banknotes  and  coins. 
Chapter One discusses the scope for national variations.  It concludes that to  maximise 
the benefits of a single currency the basic system,  nomenclature,  banknotes and  coins 
should  be  as  near  uniform  as  is  politically  acceptable  but  that  there  is  a  need  for 
considerable delegation to member states on the way the system is introduced. 
THE "ASSOCIABILITY" PROBLEM 
14.  Because of the close relationship - the  ready "associability" - between old and new 
currencies,  the  period  of  dual-currency  working  in  UK  shops  from  D  Day  could  be 
simplified in ways which will not be practicable in the European Union. 
The practice urged on retailers large and small by the Decimal Currency Board was that 
14 they should operate from D Day in one currency or the other and not in both. 
They should be either £sd shops or £p shops.  This was possible because currency in 
multiples  of two  and  a  half new pence  (six  old  pence)  was  the  same  value  in  both 
establishments. Coins and notes of two and a half pence or higher value were usable in 
both £sd  and decimal  shops.  The difference was that £sd  shops (rapidly declining  in 
number) gave small change in old money; decimal shops gave the new halfpenny, penny 
and twopence coins in small change. 
This  approach  to  cash  handling  was  widely  publicized  in  general  publicity  and  in  a 
booklet issued free to all shops by the DCB with the help of the banks.  Shops did not 
need two tills, one for £sd and one for £p.  Nor was it regarded as necessary or sensible 
for retailers to use a conversion table to assess the value of those amounts which did not 
translate exactly. 
15. The approach to cash-handling in the European Union will necessarily be different. 
It will be unclear for some time which,  if any,  amounts in the old currency and coinage 
will  convert exactly and  neatly into the  new single currency.  Careful  research  will  be 
needed  into the best ways of dealing with  the  inescapable dual-currency changeover 
period - perhaps involving practical tests by applied psychologists as well as discussions 
with retailers. This analytical work will have to be done country by country. 
16. Chapter 2 describes the "associability" issue more generally, particularly as a useful 
guide to familiarizing the public with new money and price conversions.  It concludes that 
"associability" for these purposes may be less valuable than was assumed both in other 
Commonwealth countries and in the UK.  Conversion table were not consulted as widely 
as  expected  and  dual-price  tickets  on  items  for  sale  (never  compulsory)  quickly 
disappeared. 
LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS 
17. The dual currency period presents legislative problems not only for cash-handling but 
more widely for the conversion of accounting records of all kinds including bank accounts 
and cheques 
These problems are likely to differ from country to country so they too must be analyzed 
15 and resolved nationally in the European Union. 
Complex issues arise.  Chapter 3 describes some  of the  issues which arose  in  the UK 
currency decimalisation. 
Of  equal  importance  to  the  determination  of  situations  for  which  clear  legislative 
provision had to be made was the determination of those which were more sensibly left 
to organizations to settle for themselves. 
For example,  the "sixpenny multiples" advice described in  paragraph  14 above had no 
legislative backing;  nor had the most commonly used conversion table - The Shoppers 
Table- which was intended as a guide to the repricing of goods and services and to help 
the public to grasp the relationship between old  and  new money.  Chapter 3 describes 
both the Shoppers Table and its uses and the Banking and Accounting Table. 
THE ORGANIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE CHANGEOVER 
18.  Throughout  the  whole  of  the  preparatory  work  for  UK  decimalisation  the 
accountability and organizational arrangements were clear. 
The 1961/63 Committee of Inquiry- the Halsbury Committee- had to investigate issues 
and  make  recommendations  to  the  Government  on  the  decimal  system  and  the 
changeover pattern. Thereafter the responsibility for final decisions rested with Ministers 
through the Treasury. 
Once the decisions were taken,  responsibility for facilitating the introduction rested with 
the Decimal Currency Board. 
Accountability  and  organizational  arrangements  are  more  complex  in  the  European 
Union. All participating states and their Ministers and Parliaments are involved as well as 
the Commission and the European Monetary Institute. 
But it is essential that accepted and authoritative arrangements are made and that these 
accountability matters are clarified and agreed early. There should also be full and open 
consultation  by  an  accepted  central  authority  which  may  or  may  not  mirror  the  UK 
Decimal Currency Board. 
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It  is  important  that  similar  bodies  be  established  in  each  member  state  with  full 
Government  support  because  changeover  issues  (legal,  machine,  governmental, 
banking, cash handling and publicity) will vary.  The operation must be decentralized as 
far as is practicable. 
THE UK DECIMAL CURRENCY BOARD 
19. The UK Decimal Currency Board (DCB) is not the only model for an organization to 
steer the move to a single currency but its work proved valuable in  the UK and similar 
bodies were valuable in Australia and New Zealand in their 1966 and 1967 changeovers 
from £sd to decimal money. It may be useful therefore to describe the status and role of 
the DCB in some detail. 
20. The decision to have a DCB was announced by the Government in March 1966 and 
appointments were announced about the time details of the proposed system were given 
in December of that year (paragraph 3 above). 
The Board began work early in the following year and remained an advisory body until it 
was given statutory status in the Decimal Currency Act of 1967. 
The  ten  members  were  not  civil  servants  and  although  together  they  had  direct 
experience in the main areas affected by the changeover (central and local politics and 
administration,  banking,  business,  accountancy,  engineering,  wholesaling,  retailing, 
transport,  trade unionism,  consumerism,  teaching and journalism) they were picked for 
their individual abilities not as representatives or lobbyists for particular groups.  They 
were to take an informed, objective view of problems. 
The Chairman - Lord Fiske - had been Labour Party leader of the then Greater London 
Council with a distinguished career in public service. The Deputy Chairman - Lord Erroll -
had  held  senior  Cabinet  posts  in  Conservative  Party  governments  and  had  senior 
business posts.  Lord Halsbury, chairman of the former Committee of Inquiry, was also a 
member. There was a "Technical Member'' because of the wide machine issues.  During 
its life the Board built up a strong team spirit. Members were only part-time and given a 
modest fee. 
21. The full Board met roughly once each month and there were on average also about 
17 three  committee  meetings  every  two  months  to  deal  with  machine  problems,  cash-
handling problems and publicity. Although the DCB could by law be given directives by 
the Treasury,  this power was  never exercised.  Senior Board  staff consulted  informally 
and  openly with Treasury contacts.  Each  year the  DCB  had to  present a report to  the 
Treasury which  that department must place  before  Parliament.  It  had  a great  deal  of 
independence, its role essentially being to facilitate a speedy and efficient transition. 
But the DCB had no powers to direct organizations or individuals to act in certain ways;  it 
worked through consultation,  co-operation and persuasion. When policy decisions were 
required on aspects of the decimal system (for example on the exact date and name of D 
Day,  the  specification  of the  50p  coin,  the  dates  of coinage  changes,  the  case  for 
compensation, the ending of the changeover period) the DCB made recommendations to 
Treasury Ministers. 
The DCB staff were civil servants and numbered 52  at the peak in  1970/71. They were 
chosen from a variety of departments and the work-load was heavy. 
22.  The terms of reference of the DCB  as  set out in  the Decimal Currency Act of 1967 
are listed in Table 2.  The actual work fell  into the following categories which overlap in 
time: 
(i) Building contacts with interested groups throughout the economy to  identify common 
problems and the needs for central guidance or legislation. 
(ii)  Making  recommendations  to  the  Government  through  the  Treasury  on  remaining 
uncertainties about the system. 
(iii) Co-operating closely with the Treasury, the Royal Mint and the banks on  legislative 
and other needs and assisting Ministers to steer legislation through Parliament. 
(iv)  Co-operating  with  machine  interests  to  find  cost-effective  ways  of converting  or 
replacing machines affected. 
(v)  Stimulating  managers  throughout  the  economy  to  identify  and  resolve  their  own 
problems  - starting  with  Government  Departments  and  big  business,  moving  on  to 
retailers and other cash-handlers, then to small shops and other small businesses. 
(vi) Giving talks and issuing reference booklets, films, exhibition stands,  newsletters and 
18 other material in pursuance of (v) above. 
(vii) Organizing publicity campaigns to prepare the general public for coinage changes 
and then for D Day itself- including extensive newspaper and  TV advertising and the 
mailing of a booklet with conversion tables to every household. 
19 (viii) Handling a growing number of letters and telephone calls about the changeover. 
23.  By  law,  the  Board  was  enabled  to  make  "investigations  and  surveys"  to  obtain 
necessary information. This ability was widely used. 
Advertising  agents  were  selected  as  early  as  1967  and  arranged  periodic  market 
research  studies into the awareness and preparations of both the  business community 
and the public. These were essential in directing and adjusting continuing publicity work. 
Operational  research  experts were  commissioned  to  study patterns of coin  circulation 
and to estimate the number of new low value coins needed by D Day. 
Applied psychologists were commissioned to advise on the ease with which people might 
accustom themselves to different coin  shapes for the  SOp  without confusion with other 
coins.  They  also  advised  on  the  appropriate  layout  for conversion  tables.  All  these 
studies not only helped to smooth the changeover but also had financial benefits. 
THE COST OF THE CHANGEOVER 
24.  The total cost of the UK changeover is not known.  No-one needed to know once the 
decision was taken that the costs should lie where they fell with no compensation from 
the Government beyond normal tax-relief for business expenses. 
The  Government  of course  paid  for  minting  costs,  the  DCB  and  its  publicity,  and 
Government departments' own changeover. 
The  banks  had  heavy costs  in  storing  and  distributing  coins  in  addition  to  their own 
changeover expenditure.  Retailers faced high costs on  machine conversions,  repricing, 
dual-pricing, conversion tables and staff training.  All businesses had some accounting, 
machine, repricing, training and stationery costs. 
The  1961/63  Committee  of  Inquiry  regarded  most  expenditure  other  than  that  for 
machine  conversion,  minting,  the  bank high-speed  changeover and  publicity as  "non-
measurable".  (The  figures  estimated  for  the  "measurable"  expenditure  were  highly 
speculative). 
It was also impossible to  measure the benefits of the change.  The Government policy 
20 was that a general  scheme  of compensation was  not appropriate and  on  DCB  advice 
ruled  out  compensation  even  for  .. special  cases".  Expenditure  on  business  machines, 
improvements  generally  and  staff  training  are  incurred  constantly  and  it  can  be  a 
wasteful academic exercise to attempt to isolate that which is solely attributable to one 
operation. 
A  Government  compensation  scheme  for  machine  costs  (like  those  in  South  Africa, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand)  risked  putting  the  operation  into  a  rigid  framework, 
lengthening  the  changeover  period  and  removing  the  incentive  to  find  cost-effective 
solutions to the problems.  The absence of a compensation  scheme combined with  the 
long preparatory period was a significant contributory factor to the speed and success of 
the UK changeover. 
25.  One  fact  dominated  thinking  about  costs.  The  business  community  wanted  the 
change to decimal currency and it was by 1966 universally accepted that the  long term 
and  continuing  saving  from  it,  although  non-measurable,  would  greatly  outweigh  the 
once-and-for  -all changeover costs. 
It is  interesting that the same  argument is used  in  the May 1994 report "Preparing the 
Transition to the Single Currency" by the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe-
"The  single  currency  remains  a priority objective,  since  the  benefits  of the  change  to 
European  cross-border  trade  and  economic  growth  will  be  permanent.  They  will  be 
greater than  the  once-and-for-all  cost  of the  change,  while  the  cost  of doing  nothing 
would be much higher." 
21 Chapter One 
THE SCOPE FOR NATIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE DESIGN AND INTRODUCTION OF 
THE COMMON EUROPEAN CURRENCY 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The commitment to a single currency for member states of the European Union which 
meet the convergence criteria and have not negotiated an 'opt out' is clear.  But-a great 
deal  has  yet  to  be  decided  about  both  the  currency  system  itself  (nomenclature, 
denominations, specifications and designs of banknotes and coins) and also the method 
of introduction (timing, gradual or 'big bang', cash handling issues, the roles of the centre 
and of participating states). 
This  chapter  considers  how far  the  pattern  should  be  a  standard  one  and  how  far 
variation  might  be  acceptable.  It  is  based  on  a  reading  of existing  reports  and  the 
practical  experience  of  UK  currency  decimalisation.  Because  it  has  involved  no 
consultation  within  member  states  and  sectors  of  the  economy  affected  by  the 
changeover, views expressed must be regarded as personal. 
BENEFITS OF A SINGLE CURRENCY. 
2.  This is not the place to debate all the economic and political pros and cons of a single 
currency but the issue of 'subsidiarity' has to be considered in relation to the perceived 
benefits.  These  are  persuasively  set  out  in  the  article  "Porquoi  Ia  monnaie  unique? 
Comment?" by Christophe Bourdillon in the 28th issue of the journal ECU  published in 
August 1994. 
The case can be briefly stated as follows.  The economic stability of the European Union 
and its ability to control inflation and to compete in World Markets will be strengthened. 
Not only will fluctuating exchange rates disappear (which could be achieved solely by the 
23 'freezing' of those rates) but there will no longer be barriers to internal European trade 
because of the  inconvenience and cost of currency exchange.  For business  and  for 
customers  prices  will  be  universally  recognised  and  competition  will  be  promoted. 
Indeed, the benefits of an economic community cannot be maximised so long as a dozen 
or more different currencies are in use inside it. 
Ordinary people  and  small  businesses  without  international  links  benefit through  the 
expected  boost  to  the  economy,  cost  reductions  and  spurs  to  competition.  On  an 
immediate practical level the increasing number of people who travel to other member 
states on holiday, as well as on business, will no longer face the inconvenience of buying 
different currency whenever they cross a border.  They will be able to judge prices and 
make payment or count change without difficulty. 
NATIONAL PRESSURES 
3.  We have to recognise that people become attached to their own national and long-
established currency systems and the associated nomenclature,  bank notes and coins. 
These are part of national history and identity.  Some people will even see the move to a 
common  currency as  an  erosion  of their nation's  status  and will  express  such  views 
through their elected representatives and the media. 
The actual  changeover process will  also be inconvenient and costly (even  though the 
benefits should quickly outstrip the costs).  Well judged publicity can help counter such 
doubts but it is unlikely to eliminate them. 
4.  The  logical  way ahead and  the  most  likely to  achieve all  the  benefits of a  single 
currency  is  undoubtedly to  introduce a  completely uniform system with  identical  bank 
notes and coins everywhere. 
It must be for central bank governors and Ministers to decide whether this ideal course 
should be modified, perhaps conceding minor variations to meet national wishes in the 
interest of ensuring rapid progress towards achievement of the main benefits. 
24 (4) 
A great danger is that reluctance to face up to remaining  undecided elements of the 
single currency system and to take decisions about them will hold up preparatory work 
which,  unavoidably,  will be  long and  detailed.  If the  benefits of single  currency  are 
accepted,  secondary matters,  however politically difficult and  emotive,  should  not be 
allowed to delay attainment of them. 
5.  Important decisions have yet to be taken.  There are some misgivings about the name 
of the major unit.  No agreed name exists for the minor unit, its hundredth part.  Bank 
note and coin denominations, specifications and designs have to be settled.  The general 
shape of the changeover must be settled.  The general shape of the changeover must be 
settled.  Many detailed but important questions have to be answered about expression of 
amounts, legal issues, cash handling, banking, and machine problems. 
6.  This paper assumes that the denominations and general specifications of bank notes 
and coins (sizes, shapes, metal content) will be the same everywhere.  Unless this is so, 
single  currency  has  little  meaning.  But  there  is  room  for  some  debate  about 
nomenclature and designs on notes and coins. 
NOMENCLATURE 
7.  The ecu has a ·tong and distinguished numismatic history but many of those who have 
assessed money values in, for example, francs, marks or pounds throughout their lives 
will  perhaps  be loath  to  accept  it as  a  currency  unit  - particularly  perhaps  in  non-
francophone countries. 
It is worth considering whether, provided a basically un~form currency system is chosen, 
it matters if countries select their own names for major and minor units.  For accounting 
purr-..oses money sums would be the same everywhere.  Even prices in shops would in 
assAntials be the same. 
But we presumably need bank notes and coins to be legal tender everywhere and they 
must have names and designs which are readily accepted everywhere.  At least in the 
25 early months shop staff and the public cannot be expected to recognise twelve or more 
differently designed and differently-named currencies.  We surely want to avoid the need 
for exchanging  money at borders  or for countries which  have  many  overseas  visitors 
having to arrange regular 'repatriation' of currencies. 
8.  There nevertheless remains  the  problem  of choosing  names  and  designs on  bank 
notes and coins which will be acceptable to all participating states.  Ecu already has a 
European status.  It can be interpreted as 'European currency unit' in many states.  And 
it  is  conveniently  short.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  word  other  than  'ecu'  would  be 
accepted more readily- certainly not the name of the currency unit of any one member 
state. 
'Europa' is a possibility but,  despite its obviousness and its roots in European mythology, 
it is awkwardly polysyllabic.  'Cene  is the logical name for its hundredth paret and it was 
adopted  without  serious dissent in  South  Africa,  Australia  and  New Zealand  (as  were 
'Rand' for the South African major unit and  'Dollar' for the  major units of Australia and 
New Zealand). 
It may be that citizens are more adaptable in money matters than politicians sometimes 
fear - and  a  European  Commission  survey  suggests  that  already  almost  60%  of the 
sample  surveyed  in  the  12  states  taken  together  are  either  strongly  in  favour  or 
somewhat in favour of the adoption of the ecu as the single currency.  It does not greatly 
matter if people  in  everyday shopping choose  to  call  the  major or minor unit by other 
'nicknames'.  But there must be official names. 
9.  The urgent need is to remove lingering doubts about both major and minor units and 
the denominations of bank notes and coins which will be  needed for cash transactions. 
(In a decimal system,  the range of denominations is clear; the remaining doubt is where 
the borderline should lie between bank notes and coins). 
The basic specifications for bank notes and coins must depend on  recommendations by 
the central banks through the EMI  and by Mint directors.  Valuable work has been done 
but  further  consultation  with  cash-handlers,  machine  interests,  organisations 
26 representing  the  blind  - and  perhaps  practical  tests  with  members  of the  public  - is 
probably needed. 
Decisions  on  names,  denominations,  specification  of  banknotes  and  coins  and  the 
designs on them are the essential preliminaries to producing and distributing those notes 
and coins.  Together these constitute the 'critical path' - the longest and heaviest of the 
many preparatory tasks of the changeover to a single currency for cash transactions. 
1  0.  A  currency  changeover,  once  basic  policy  decisions  are  taken,  is  a  matter  of 
painstakingly detailed work.  In  Britain the Decimal  Currency Board spent time early in 
the preparatory period deciding how amounts of money should be expressed in printing, 
writing and speech.  A reference booklet was published on this subject and was in great 
demand. 
The topic may seem trivial but there is a need to decide such things as what symbol or 
letter should  be  used  as  an  abbreviation  for  major  and  minor units;  whether  chosen 
letters  should  be  in  upper or  lower  case  and  appear before  or  after the  name;  how 
cheques should be written; whether to use a decimal point or a comma or a dash. 
It  may  be  argued  that  these  points  are  best  left  to  memtiler  states  or  even  (less 
convincingly)  to  individual  organisations  and  that  resolving  them  is  not  of immediate 
concern.  But  how amounts  of money  are  expressed  is  important  in  the  redesign  of 
stationery,  in training and publicity material and in  the revision of school text books.  A 
decision  on  whether  such  matters  are  to  be  left  to  member  states  - with  some 
consequential  but  perhaps  acceptable  risk  of  public  confusion  - must  not  be  long 
delayed. 
DESIGNS ON BANK NOTES AND COINS 
11.  The arguments for and against standard European-wide designs are similar to those 
on nomenclature.  There will be opposition to the loss under a uniform system of such 
national  indicators  as  the  heads  of  monarchs,  and  the  existence  of many  different 
European languages is a constraint on wording. 
27  . A superficially attractive course would be to have one side of bank notes or coins given 
over to  a  European  design  and  the  other  to  a  national  design,  despite  training  and 
publicity problems.  On the other hand, once a currency is established, people probably 
recognise bank notes and coins by their expected size, shape, colour and 'feel' and look 
closely only if they suspect forgeries so the risk of lasting serious confusion may not be 
high.  Bank notes and coins of 'other countries' will soon accumulate in tourist countries 
and repatriation would be wasteful.  Does it really make sense to have over 12 different 
designs? 
12.  For bank notes a compromise which  should cause no problems would be to  have 
them  largely standard Europe-wide but with small discrete national symbols.  This fairly 
ready  identification  of  the  country  of  origin  might  even  encourage  commendable 
competition to produce notes of the highest technical  quality!  Plainly with  a standard 
European design it would be necessary to keep the wording on notes and coins to a bare 
minimum with Arabic numerals prominent. 
The designs themselves would have to be as simple as is consistent with security needs 
and any portraits confined to figures in the world of the arts rather than national heroes. 
These are matters likely to excite controversy. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREED SYSTEM 
13.  Although this paper argues for the maximum acceptable degree of uniformity in the 
single currency system and the bank notes and coins which will  be  its manifestation in 
everyday life, there is an equally strong need for maximum decentralisation and national 
discretion in the system's introduction. 
It is not possible to mastermind the changeover from one centre.  Legal issues will differ. 
Government department issues will  differ.  The  differences  between  the  ecu  currency 
and existing currencies and the resulting problems for cash-handling,  staff training and 
public  education  will  differ.  The  extent  of  coin  -or  bank  note  - operated  machine 
problems will differ.  Banking problems will differ. 
28 14.  Clearly there has to be a central  authoritative coordinating body to set the general 
framework  of the  changeover  and  to  discuss  and  disseminate  suggestions  of good 
practice but there must also be  national  currency boards to  explore national  issues in 
depth and to co-operate at chairman and lower levels with the central team.  The time 
has surely come to establish these national study groups to complement the work of the 
central group. 
One issue worth examination is whether it would be practicable for countries to decide 
for themselves,  subject to  a very broad  central  guidance,  on  whether to  aim for a big 
bang changeover or a rather more gradual one. 
CONCLUSIONS 
15.  The main conclusions are: 
(i)  To  obtain  full  benefit  from  a  common  currency,  the  system  and  its  supporting 
nomenclature, bank notes and coins should be as near standard as possible. 
(ii)  There is a need to seek agreement quickly on such outstanding matters if there can 
be confidence in introducing a common currency smoothly before the year 2000 for day 
to day cash transactions. 
(iii) There is scope for maximum delegation to member states on the introduction of the 
chosen system. 
(iv)  In  addition to a central co-ordinating body there is a need for suitably empowered 
study groups in member states. 
(v)  Complete  openness  and  close  co-operation  are  desirable  amongst  the  many 
interests affected by this important change both centrally and nationally. 
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THE CHANGEOVER TO A EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THE .. ASSOCIABILITY PROBLEM  ... 
1. Before the changeover to decimal currency in Britain there was much discussion about 
what  Lord  Halsbury's  Committee  of  Inquiry  called  "the  associability  problem"  - the 
readiness with which the general public would adapt themselves to the new system and 
the  extent to which  this  would  be  facilitated  by  keeping  close  links  between  the  £sd 
system  and  coinage  and  the  new system  and  coinage  with  fairly  easy  conversion  of 
prices. 
This paper attempts to analyze the significance of "associability" and its relevance to a 
move to a common European currency. Table 1 showing the UK coinage before and after 
the changeover (see above) might be helpful. 
ASSOCIABILITY IN THE UK DECIMAL CURRENCY CHANGEOVER 
2.  During the 1960's few people questioned the need to decimalise the UK currency but 
there were prolonged and  heated debates about which decimal system to  adopt.  It was 
largely the  inability to  agree  on  a  system  which  delayed  decimalisation.  This  debate 
centered eventually on the differences between the £-new penny (plus half new penny) 
system recommended by the majority of the Halsbury Committee and a system based on 
a new major unit worth 10 shillings (SOp now) in £,s,d. The "1 0 shilling" system had been 
chosen by three Commonwealth countries which decimalised from  £,s,d,  before the UK 
(South Africa, Australia and New Zealand). 
"Associability" arguments loomed large in the choices made in those countries and also 
in the minds of the two members of the Halsbury Committee who wrote a minority report 
favouring a "1 0 shilling" system. 
Retailers, other cash handlers and consumer groups pressed hard for such a system in 
31 Britain:  it would allow more of the familiar £sd coins to remain in  use with neat decimal 
values and would make everyday "shillings and pence" amounts fairly easily recognized 
in their decimal form.
2 Conversion sums would be simpler. There would be no need for a 
new halfpenny (held to be illogical in a decimal system). 
3. The chosen £ system, of course, also had "associability" advantages, not least the fact 
that sums expressed  in  pounds needed no change whatsoever,  so  the difference was 
one of degree.  (Other arguments  related  to  the  retention  of the  £  as  an  international 
currency and the desirability of providing a lasting system against the erosion of inflation 
led the majority of the Halsbury Committee, and the Government, to select the £ system). 
4.  In their planning the Decimal Currency Board took full advantage of the "associability" 
merits of the chosen system. Two of the decimal coins (5p and lOp) had exactly the same 
values  and  general  specifications  as  the  £sd  predecessors  and  were  introduced with 
decimal designs almost three years before D.  Day; a 50p coin was introduced well over a 
year beforehand and was used as  a 1  0 shilling coin;  only the three  low value decimal 
coins with no exact £sd  equivalents appeared on  D.  Day for the first time.  (They were 
available as souvenir sets and for training purposes earlier). 
Publicity for all  the  changes  was  extensive  and  conversion  tables,  which  were  fairly 
easily  memorized,  were  widely  distributed  and  displayed.  Copies  were  included  in  a 
booklet which was sent to every household. 
ASSOCIABILITY AND THE ECU 
5.  It  is worth asking,  in  the  light of experience  and  with  the  benefit of hindsight,  how 
important "associ ability" really is.  When member states of the European Union move to a 
common currency there may be little or no easy "associability" between the old and the 
new.  It  is  impossible to  devise a  common  system  which  for all  participating  countries 
offers neat, exact conversions of existing major units, bank notes and coins. The names 
of both the major and minor units (the 1  OOth part) might well be unfamiliar. 
Conversion tables may not be  easy to  memorize.  The situation will  be  like the one we 
2It has to be remembered that over 30 years ago the£ had about 10 times its 1993 purchasing 
power so most day to day cash transactions did not involve the major unit. 
32 face when going on holiday or to work in a foreign country - with the added complication 
that for a time during any necessary changeover period the familiar notes and coins will 
still be circulating. 
6.  All  European  Union  countries  count  money  decimally but for several  of them  new 
prices will look very different from the present ones. The ecu will be of higher purchasing 
power than all major currency units except UK and Irish pounds and its hundredth part-
the  minor unit - or combinations  of it will  feature  prominently in  countries  which  have 
become accustomed to dealing only in one unit (Italy,  Spain,  Portugal, Greece). In most 
countries the minor unit will therefore assume greater significance and prices in  shops 
will  look strangely different.  Ecu banknotes and coins will  look unfamiliar and will  have 
unfamiliar values. There will, in other words, be a big "associability" problem. 
"ASSOCIABILITY" IN PERSPECTIVE 
7.  Several points are worth stressing: 
(i) "Associability" is useful only during the changeover; at best it is a temporary benefit. 
(ii) The aim is to encourage people to think and work in the new currency, not convert it 
constantly to the old. We should look forwards not backwards. 
(iii)Experience  in  Britain  and  elsewhere  shows  that,  although  "associability"  offers 
valuable reassurance  in  the  late  preparatory and  early changeover periods,  people in 
practice rely on it far less than one might expect. 
(iv)  People who  holiday  abroad  or take  jobs  abroad  accustom  themselves  quickly  to 
unfamiliar currency systems.  (Members of the  European Commission and their families 
are but one example). 
8.  Both  in  discussions  about  choice  of  system  and  coinage  and  in  assessment  of 
changeover difficulties in  Britain we  probably gave more weight to  "associability" than 
experience shows was necessary. 
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judging  prices  (to  see  whether an  item  can  be  afforded  or represents  good  value  for 
money)  and,  second,  making  payment  and  checking  change.  But  by  no  means  all 
purchases involve a deliberate conversion sum to judge prices. 
Most of our purchases are habitual: for example we  always buy,  say,  20 litres of petrol 
and in a supermarket we always buy the same packets of butter, flour,  biscuits or eggs. 
The items are familiar and needed so there is no need for mental arithmetic. If we choose 
to convert into the old currency - perhaps to check that a shop has not taken advantage 
of the change to increase prices -then for a time conversion tables will  be  prominently 
displayed or there will be dual price labels. 
Price changes of some common  items will  be well  publicized in  advance- for example 
newspapers,  postage  stamps  and  metro  fares.  When  we  have  to  consider  more 
significant,  optional purchases - perhaps clothes  or books - there will  be  more time to 
check  that  a  price  is  fair  and  affordable.  We  shall  quickly  develop  rough  mental 
yardsticks of value as  we  do when we  go  abroad  e.g.  for the  British,  £1  is  roughly 50 
Belgian francs or in Italy 2,500 Lire). Precise conversion will not be necessary. 
9.  When we  pay for purchases  in  shops,  complex  arithmetic  or  conversion  sums  are 
never necessary. We simply use clearly marked bank notes and coins as counters - or, 
more commonly, we  hand over a higher value bank note and  receive change which we 
can count up in simple round amounts (20,  10,  5,  2,  and  1  ).  Publicity campaigns should 
ensure that the  new bank notes and  coins  and  their values  are well  known  before the 
changeover day.  Similarity of the old coins with their predecessors, which we were able 
to ensure for three of the UK decimal coins, is of only very temporary significance. 
THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  "ASSOCIABILITY'  AND  IRRATIONAL 
FACTORS 
10.  To  argue in this way  is  not to  deny all  importance to  "associability".  Obvious links 
between the old and the new offer reassurance and an understanding that the change is 
not as great as people might fear. Moreover, if associability is perceived to be important, 
then it assumes an unsettling importance in the eyes of the public and the media which 
logical analysis wiH not easily counter. 
34 In Britain it became closely linked with the fear that changing the currency would lead to 
price increases which might not easily be spotted. 
These  factors  are  of particular  importance for the  elderly,  who  do  not  readily  accept 
changes in the habits of a lifetime,  and for people of slender means or failing eyesight. 
Factors which are not wholly rational  may also play a part -for example,  people might 
dislike losing the names of familiar currency units. 
In Britain we decided to retain the name "penny" for the minor unit (initially calling it "new 
penny") despite the fact that it was  worth more than  twice the value of the £sd  penny. 
This  decision  may  have  caused  a  little  confusion  but  the  probably  strong  adverse 
reaction  to  the  use of 'cent'  (though  it  is  a logical  name  for the  hundredth part of the 
major unit) was thought to be decisive. 
Generalizations  can,  however,  be  dangerous.  In  South  Africa,  Australia  and  New 
Zealand the names  of both  major and  minor units were  changed  (to  Rand  and  cent in 
South  Africa and  to  Dollar and  cent  in  Australia  and  New Zealand.)  Perhaps  in  those 
countries  a  desire  to  break  away  from  the  old  "imperial"  names  was  held  to  be 
significant! 
11. There were two other examples during the UK changeover of what might be seen as 
irrational public and media reaction or undue attachment to "associability". The first came 
when  the  50  pence  coin  was  introduced.  This  was  (and  is)  a  seven-sided  coin  - an 
"equilateral curve heptagon" with a constant breadth and thus attractive to slot machine 
operators. It was chosen after wide research and practical tests by the Decimal Currency 
Board.  It replaced a 10 shilling (SOp) bank note. 
When  the  decision  for  this  coin  was  announced  there  was  little  adverse  reaction  -
indeed, a general interest in the unconventional shape.  But when the coin first appeared 
in  pockets  and  purses  there  was  an  outburst  of  complaints  partly  because  of  the 
unfamiliarity and  partly because of alleged confusion with  10 pence  pieces.  The press 
fed  popular  prejudice  and  there  were  questions  in  Parliament  urging withdrawal.  The 
outcry was short-lived but uncomfortable. 
12. The second example came in 1970. There was a very popular £sd silver coin called a 
sixpence. People liked it and many pressed for it to remain in circulation after D Day as a 
two  and  a half pence coin  (the  exact equivalent in  value).  Pressure grew so  strong  in 
35 Parliament and  the  press that the  DCB  was  asked  to  prepare  a special  report on  the 
possibility of agreeing to keep the coin. 
The  DCB  recommended  against  this  because  we  knew  that  retailers  and  the  public 
would prefer to count in twos (using the 2p coin) rather than in  units of two and a half. 
Although the popular sixpence did not cease to be  legal tender as  quickly as  the other 
old low value £,s,d coins, it very rapidly decreased in use after D.Day. "Associability" can 
be pursued misguidedly. 
CONVERSION TABLES 
13.  In the preparatory and changeover periods,  conversion tables will be essential as  a 
guide for the  public to  the  unfamiliar  in  terms  of the  familiar  and  also  for  traders  in 
repricing goods and services. 
The  DCB  commissioned  work  from  applied  psychologists,  involving  practical  tests 
amongst shop  assistants and  the  public to  determine the  best layout and  design.  The 
"Shoppers Table " was  a  list of £sd  payable  amounts  with  the  nearest corresponding 
payable amounts  in  the  new coinage  - not the  exact equivalents because only six old 
pence and multiples of that amount converted exactly. 
It was possible to round down as many amounts as were rounded up in the range to 5p 
so  that,  if the  table  were  applied  evenly  in  the  conversion  of a  wide  range  of price 
endings, there would be no overall adverse effect on price levels. This table did not have 
the force of law because strict application could force a trading loss on  those who dealt 
only  with  a  small  range  of  items  but  it  was  consistently  used  wherever  possible; 
competition  and  publicity  given  to  the  table  ensured  this  (See  also  Chapter  3  and 
Annexe). 
14. We do not yet know how easily present amounts will translate into ecu amounts and 
the relationship will obviously vary from country to country.  It cannot be emphasized too 
strongly, however, that very careful attention will need to be given in each country to the 
design of conversion tables and the appropriate ways of presenting them to traders and 
the public. (Conversion of accounting records and sums of money in  law or contracts is 
another matter; this paper is about "associability" of old and new for the general public in 
everyday transactions.) 
36 CONCLUSIONS 
15.  Some general comments on  "associability" are given in  paragraph 7.  The following 
might now be added in relation to the change to a common European Currency: 
(i) The absence of obvious "associability'' is  likely to become a source of concern to the 
public in  the period before and  after the changeover and  it will  be  linked with a fear of 
price rises. 
(ii) Not all the concerns expressed by the public and the media will be wholly rational or 
predictable, but they will be genuine and must be dealt with sensitively. 
(iii) Most concerns will relate to differences between the present and proposed currency 
systems  and  coinages  in  individual  member states  or the  traditions  of those  states  so 
they will have to be dealt with nationally and not centrally. 
(iv)  Careful  attention  will  need  to  be  given  to  the  nature  and  timing  of  publicity 
campaigns,  especially those about recognition of new bank notes and coins and about 
conversion tables. 
(v) The shorter the period when present and new currencies are circulating together the 
better it is likely to be for the public. A short, sharp shock may be preferable to continuing 
confusion. 
(vi)  European-wide  publicity  might  best  be  directed  initially  at  fostering  a  better 
understanding of the  benefits  of a common  currency  in  order to  develop a favourable 
climate of opinion for later, more detailed publicity campaigns on the exact nature of the 
change. 
37 CHAPTER 3 
SOME  LEGAL  AND  RELATED  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  UK  1971  CHANGEOVER  TO 
DECIMAL CURRENCY 
GENERAL 
1. Two Acts of Parliament were needed for the UK changeover just as two were needed 
in Australia and New Zealand. The first UK Act became law in July 1967 and the second 
in May 1969. 
It was not possible to prepare for the change with only one piece of legislation because 
the basic system and coinage had to be settled before the detailed work about the shape 
of the changeover could be  done by  the  Treasury and  the  Decimal  Currency Board  in 
consultation with other organisations, especially the banks.  Work began about one-and-
a-half years before the passage of the second Act on which this paper concentrates. 
2.  The  1967 Act  stated  that  "on  and  after  the  appointed  day,  the  denominations  of 
money in  the currency of the  United  Kingdom  shall  be  the  pound sterling and the new 
penny, the new penny being one-hundredth part of a pound sterling". The appointed day 
was  "such  day  in  the  year  1971  as  the  Treasury  may  by  order  made  by  statutory 
instrument appoint" - that is by subordinate legislation. 
The Act also gave the basic specifications of five of the six decimal coins * and extended 
the  existing  power  to  introduce  new  denominations  by  Royal  Proclamation,  and,  for 
example, to put decimal coins into circulation before the changeover or to allow old £sd 
coins to remain in circulation afterwards (This was desirable because some old coins had 
unchanged and acceptable values in the new currency). 3 
3rhe specification of the sixth coin - 50p -was recommended later by the Decimal Currency Board and introduced by 
Royal Proclamation. 
39 The Decimal Currency Board was given statutory authority and its functions in facilitating 
the  changeover  were  listed.  The  Act  refers  to  "the  transition"  but  gives  no  specific 
authority for a changeover period. The purpose of the Act was to  settle once-and-for-all 
the  basic  decimal  system,  the  year  of the  changeover  and  the  role  of the  Decimal 
Currency Board so that all organisations could start detailed planning and the Royal Mint 
could arrange to produce the coins.  It would be a powerful stimulus for preparatory work 
if it were  politically acceptable to  have  similar early,  firm  decisions for the  move  to  a 
single European currency. 
3. The 1969 Act dealt with special arrangements for banks, with the changeover period, 
with  legal  tender,  and  with  some  aspects  of conversions  of amounts from  old  to  new 
currencies.  It  was  the  result  of wide  consultation  and  also  study  of the  changeover 
provisions in the Australian and New Zealand legislation. 
BANKS 
4.  The banks had an  immediate "Big Bang" changeover on  D Day.  They regarded it as 
impracticable to work in both old and new currencies and the 1969 Act permitted them to 
close for four days before  D Day when they converted all  machines and accounts and 
cleared all cheques in the system. Thereafter cheques along with other bills of exchange 
and promissory notes were invalid if drawn in  old  money.  The banks also decided that 
they would not use the new halfpenny in accounting. 
The  Act  gave  a  conversion  table  showing  corresponding  amounts  in  new  pence  for 
amounts in old currency- which became known  as  the Banking and Accounting Table. 
This table was by law applied to the conversion of bank accounts and of other bank and 
Government  monetary  payment  documents  issued  before  D  Day  but  presented  for 
payment  afterwards.  Another  conversion  table  - the  Shoppers'  Table  - was  of much 
greater practical significance but it did not appear in  either the  1967 or 1969 Acts and 
had  no  legal  base.  The Annex gives more  information  about the  Shoppers'  Table and 
shows both that and the Banking and Accounting Table as they appeared in the booklet 
circulated to all households.  Both tables had as  many roundings down as  roundings up 
40 with an overall balancing effect. 
THE CHANGEOVER PERIOD 
5. The changeover period was referred to in the 1969 Act as the "transitional period" and 
defined as beginning on D Day and "ending with such day as the Treasury may appoint 
by order made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of resolution of 
either House of Parliament" (The expression "D Day" for Decimal Day was not part of the 
Act;  it  was  recommended  by  the  Board  for  popular  use  and  approved  by  the 
Government). 
The significance of the ending was  twofold.  First,  at the end of the changeover period 
any old  coins  not directed  to  be  redenominated  as  decimal  coins  were  automatically 
demonetised  (in  the  event,  only  the  £sd  penny  and  three-penny  piece  were 
demonetised).  Second,  any  outstanding  £sd  payable  amounts  were  automatically 
converted into decimal amounts in accordance with the Banking and Accounting Table. 
6.  Ending  the  changeover  period  did  no  more  than  this.  There  is,  for  example,  no 
provision in the 1969 Act comparable with that in the  1870 Coinage Act (and repealed 
from D Day by the 1969 Act) which states that every contract, sale, payment, transaction 
and so on must be in terms of "the coins which are current and legal tender in pursuance 
of this  Act".  £sd  contracts  and  transactions  never became  illegal;  people  are  free  to 
transact their affairs in old, new or foreign currency as they please. 
THE GENERAL APPROACH TO CONVERSION PROBLEMS 
7.  It became clear to Treasury and Board officials working on the legislation that the law 
could not specify what should happen in all the circumstances of the changeover. A great 
deal was best left for reasonable people to  settle amongst themselves - aided perhaps 
by advice from the Board. The amounts of money at stake were generally negligible and 
commonsense would normally suggest the solution to conversion difficulties. 
41 The law should, it was thought, touch only on those areas where there was a clear legal 
problem  and  where  the  lack  of a  firm  lead  could  result  in  time-wasting  disputes  or 
unfairness.  The  most  helpful  approach  was  to  concentrate  not  on  how  to  convert 
amounts of money but how to make payments. 
8.  For most old money amounts which  did  not involve payment,  exact conversion was 
appropriate. It would be wrong to use a conversion table for converting a unit price in a 
contract for the purchase of hundreds of items or a wage rate which had to be multiplied 
by the number of hours worked; the cumulative effect on the calculated total of roundings 
which were tiny in themselves could be considerable. 
LEGAL TENDER 
9. The 1969 Act made the new coins legal tender and set new legal tender limits. From D 
Day "coppers" became legal tender for amounts up to 20p; cupro-nickel coins up to and 
including  1  Op  became  legal  tender for  amounts  up  to  £5;  coins  above  1  Op  in  value 
became legal tender up to £10. The Act also provided that during the changeover period 
£sd  coins,  decimal  coins,  and  mixed  £sd  and  decimal  coins would  be  legal  tender for 
either £sd or decimal amounts.  In effect, the £sd penny was also a "five-twelfths of a new 
penny" coin and the new halfpenny was also a "one and one fifth of an  old penny" coin. 
Thus,  it was always open to a debtor during the changeover to settle an £sd debt in £sd 
cash  - even  if the  creditor had  gone decimal  and  found  it inconvenient to  accept low-
value £sd coins. 
1  0.  In  practice,  the sensible thing to  do was to  use old  pennies and  threepenny bits in 
decimal transactions in multiples of sixpence (2.5p);  only in "sixpenny lots" were the two 
coinages interchangeable and this was the basis of the Board's advice to cash-handlers 
and  to the public about "mixed  money  ...  If coins were  always offered  in  "sixpenny lots" 
then it was possible for the seller to give exact change, whether he was operating in £sd 
or decimal. 
This  concept was  not  in  the  legislation  because  it  would  have  contradicted  the  basic 
42 British common  law principle that a good tender is either the exact amount or a higher 
amount provided change is not required.  It would have been difficult to declare the coins 
legal tender - but only in  certain  circumstances for certain transactions.  Moreover,  the 
law says nothing about change-giving and it would therefore have been wrong to write a 
provision in the Act which implied change-giving. And,  whatever the  legal tender limits, 
retailers  and  their  customers  are  in  a  negotiating  situation  and  a  retailer  is  free  to 
stipulate in  advance the coins he will  and will  not accept.  (Inn-keepers  and  'common 
carriers' - an expression which covers some but not all transport operators -do not have 
quite the same freedom.) 
In the event these legal niceties and the apparent gap between the strict letter of the law 
and the practical advice which was given by the Board, and which was almost universally 
followed, led to no difficulties.  The experience affords an interesting example of how it is 
sometimes preferable in  practical  operations to  rely  on  the exercise of common  sense 
instead of attempting to legislate in detail for all eventualities. 
The same will  be  true during the  change to  a single currency although the exact legal 
position will vary from  country to  country and  it is  unlikely that there will  be  convenient 
associability  between  old  and  new  coinages  which  facilitates  something  like  the 
"sixpenny lots" rule. 
PAYABLE AMOUNTS 
11.  References to £sd in legislation were automatically converted to decimal from D Day 
on an exact basis (one old penny equals five twelfths of a new penny) but references in 
contracts and agreements were untouched; they need only be altered at the instance and 
with the agreement of the parties concerned. 
The validity of all these contracts was unaffected. 
The  law concentrated  on  how  money  payments  should  be  made  - but  there  was  no 
attempt to deal with every eventuality. 
How  an  outstanding  debt  was  settled  was  a  matter  for  the  parties  concerned; 
conversions on  the basis of the  Shoppers' Table for cash  payment or the  Banking and 
Accounting Table for payment by  cheque was  recommended  by the  Board  and  almost 
43 universally followed in practice.  A few people no doubt exercised their right to pay the 
exact amount in £sd cash during the changeover period but the old coins disappeared so 
quickly that this soon ceased to be practicable. 
12.  The  Act  did,  however,  make  special  provision  for  periodical  payments,  on  the 
grounds that differences which were trivial in the case of once-for-all debts might well be 
significant when multiplied by the total number of outstanding payments in a series and 
thus  give  rise  to  disputes  and  considerable  administrative  inconvenience  for  the 
organisations concerned - banks, insurance companies, building societies, hire purchase 
companies and so on.  It would have been an intolerable burden for these organisations 
to renegotiate individually with all the payers.  The  Act therefore permitted - but did not 
oblige - the payer to  convert periodical  payments  (except wages and  salaries) on  the 
basis of the Banking and Accounting Table. 
CONCLUSION 
13.  The 1969 Act was complex.  Several special situations not mentioned here had to be 
dealt with - for example,  the existence of many insurance policies based on very small 
periodical payments of a few £sd pence. 
There will be similar special circumstances in  European countries which will need close 
examination.  Basic  legislation  governing  monetary matters  and  legal  tender will  also 
differ from country to country.  Some of the issues can be  resolved only when details of 
the single currency system and its relation to the national currency are known. 
14.  Obviously conversion  tables  will  be  needed  in  all  participating  states  and  careful 
attention will have to be given to their legal status, design and presentation. 
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45 ANNEX 
CONVERSION TABLES 
1.  On D Day three new bronze coins came into circulation - 2p,  1  p,  and 1/2p.  The new 
system  was  not a 'pure'  decimal  place  system  with  1  00  new pence  to  the  unchanged 
pound sterling;  there was also a new halfpenny- worth  rather more than the previous 
£sd  penny.  (The existence of a fraction was  seen  by the critics as  a weakness  in  the 
chosen system and was one reason why some of them preferred to abandon the Pound 
and  have a new major unit half its value - as  happened  in  South Africa,  Australia and 
New Zealand).  In Britain there was a clear need for a coin of lower value than the new 
penny  and  it  formed  an  essential  part  of the  system  of  pricing.  The  initial  minting 
programme  included  950  million  halfpenny  coins  compared  with  1050  million  penny 
coins.  The halfpenny's existence meant that no old money amount had a corresponding 
amount in new money different by more than 0.6 of an old penny.  Any amount ending in 
'sixpence' (old money) or multiples of it converted exactly into new money. 
2.  The Shoppers' Table, using the halfpenny, was the main conversion table used in 
the preparatory and changeover periods and the basis of much of the Decimal Currency 
Board's  publicity.  It  was  intended  as  a guide to  traders  in  the  repricing  of goods and 
services and the preparation of dual price labels.  For the public it was a general aid to 
understanding the relationship between old and new money values.  It was used not only 
by the Board but by many other organisations which provided guidance material for the 
public and staff training; and it formed part of the booklet sent to every household before 
D Day - as a detachable folded card. 
3.  In  the  range  of 12  old  money amounts  up  to  'one  shilling'  (Sp)  there  is  an  equal 
number of roundings up and roundings down so that gains and losses balance out (5 up, 
5  down  and  2  unchanged).  If the  table  is  used  to  convert  on  an  evenly  distributed 
number of old money amounts there is no overall effect;  applied to price endings neither 
buyer nor seller is worse off. 
47 4.  There was debate about whether the Shoppers' Table should have legal force.  The 
Board convinced the Government and Parliament that it should not.  To oblige traders to 
reprice on this basis might compel those who deal in  low-priced items to accept a loss. 
There would  also  be  considerable  difficulty  in  administering  and  policing  such  a  law. 
Moreover,  manufacturers would obviously wish to  repackage products,  perhaps altering 
weight or quantity, in order to produce attractive new money selling prices. 
5.  The Board was convinced - and  experience showed this to  be the case - that wide 
central  publicity for the  Shoppers' Table  coupled with  the forces  of competition would 
ensure that no  organisation  departed from  that table  in  repricing  without good reason. 
There is no evidence that decimalisation itself led to an increase in price inflation. 
6.  The halfpenny remained an essential part of the UK currency for a long time after D 
Day.  It  was  demonetised  at  the  end  of  1984  when  the  cumulative  effect  of general 
inflation had made it useless. 
7.  One point must be  stressed;  the  Shoppers' Table was  not intended to  apply to the 
exchange of coins.  For example, 3 old pence was not the same value as one new penny 
and neither traders nor shoppers were expected to  accept the old £sd threepenny piece 
or the new penny coin as if they were equal. 
8.  When  a  single  European  currency  is  introduced  there  will  be  the  same  need  for 
conversion tables with an overall balancing of roundings-up and down.  If only one table 
is  needed (ie for banking and  accounting and well as  cash transactions) the arguments 
for  giving  a  table  legal  force  in  certain  circumstances  will  be  different  but  the  UK 
experience may be helpful. 
9.  The  legal  status  of the  Banking and Accounting Table is  described  in  Chapter 3. 
Both  tables  are  attached  to  this  Annex  in  the  Form  in  which  they  appeared  in  "Your 
Guide to Decimal Money", the booklet sent to all households before D Day. 
48 Old New  Old  New  Old New  Old  New  Old  New  Shoppers'  £sd  £p  £sd  £p  £sd  £p  £sd  £p  £sd  £p 
2/- 10  4/- 20  6/- 30  8/- 40  table 
1  t  2/1  10!  4/1  20!  6/1  30f  8/1  40f 
2  1  2/2  11  4/2  21  6/2  31  8/2  41 
3  1  2/3  11  4/3  21  6/3  31  8/3  41 
4  1f  2/4  11f  4/4  21f  6/4  31t  8/4  41t  • 
5  2  2/5  12  4/5  22  6/5  32  8/5  42  liD~~[ 
~~ 
6  2t  2/6  12t  4/6  22t  6/6  32t  8/6  42f  rnJ!ID/jlOOIID 
7  3  2/7  13  4/7  23  6/7  33  8/7  43 
8  3t  2/8  13t  4/8  23t  6/8  33t  8/8  43t  This table will help you to check 
9  4  2/9  14  4/9  24  6/9  34  8/9  44 
10 4  2/10 14  4/10 24  6/10 34  8/10 44 
decimal prices against previous £sd 
11  4t  2/11  14t  4/11  24t  6/11  34t  8/11  44t 
prices, but there is no need to learn it 
by heart. 
1/- 5  3/- 15  5/- 25  7/- 35  9/- 45 
Remember, shops will charge either 
1/1  st  3/1  15f  5/1  25t  7/1  35t  9/1  45t 
£p prices or £sd prices, but not both. 
You cannot use this table to choose 
1/2  6  3/2  16  5/2  26  7/2  36  9/2  46  whether you pay the £sd or the £p 
1/3  6  3/3  16  5/3  26  7/3  36  9/3  46 
1/4  6t  3/4  16t  5/4  26t  7/4  36t  9/4  46t  price. 
1/5  7  3/5  17  5/5  27  7/5  37  9/5  47 
1/6  7t  3/6  17t  5/6  27t  7/6  37t  9/6  47t 
1/7  8  3/7  18  5/7  28  7/7  38  9/7  48 
1/8  at  3/8  1St  5/8  28t  7/8  38t  9/8  48t 
1/9  9  3/9  19  5/9  29  7/9  39  9/9  49 
1/10  9  3/10 19  5/10 29  7/10 39  9/10 49 
1111  st  3/11 19t  5/11  29t  7/11  39t  9/11  49t 
Old  New  Old  New  Old New  Old New  Old New 
£sd  £p  £sd  £p  £sd  £p  £sd  £p  £sd  £p 
Before using this table you will find it  10/- 50  12/- 60  14/- 70  16/- 80  18/- 90 
helpful to read the official booklet  10/1  sot  12/1  60!  14/1  70!  16/1  sot  18/1  sot 
·vour  Guide to Decimal Money.  10/2  51  12/2  61  14/2  71  16/2  81  18/2  91 
10/3  51  12/3  61  14/3  71  16/3  81  18/3  91 
Remember, the £ stays the same but is  10/4  51!  12/4  61!  14/4  71!  16/4  81t  18/4  91! 
made up of 100 new pence.  10/5  52  12/5  62  14/5  72  16/5  82  18/5  92 
To check a decimal price, find the  10/6  52!  12/6  62!  14/6  72t  16/6  82!  18/6  92! 
amount in the column headed 'New £p',  10/7  53  12/7  63  14/7  73  16/7  83  18/7  93 
which is printed in bold figures, and the  10/8  53t  12/8  63t  14/8  73!  16/8  83!  18/8  93! 
corresponding £sd price will be seen on  10/9  54  12/9  64  14/9  74  16/9  84  18/9  94 
its left.  10/10 54  12/10 64  14/10 74  16/10 84  18/10 94 
10/11  54!  12/11  64!  14/11  74!  16/11  84t  18/11  94t 
If you need to convert an £sd price into 
the new money, find the amount in the  11/- 55  13/- 65  15/- 75  17/- 85  19/- 95 
column headed 'Old £sd~  and the  11/1  sst  13/1  65!  15/1  75t  17/1  sst  19/1  sst 
corresponding price in new pence will  11/2  56  13/2  66  15/2  76  17/2  86  19/2  96 
be seen on its right.  11/3  56  13/3  66  15/3  76  17/3  86  19/3  96 
11/4  56t  13/4  66t  15/4  76t  17/4  86!  19/4  96t 
11/5  57  13/5  67  15/5  77  17/5  87  19/5  97 
11/6  57t  13/6  67t  15/6  77t  17/6  87!  19/6  97! 
11/7  58  13/7  68  15/7  78  17/7  88  19/7  98 
11/8  sat  13/8  68!  15/8  78t  17/8  sat  19/8  sat 
11/9  59  13/9  69  15/9  79  17/9  89  19/9  99 
11/10 59  13/10 69  15/10 79  17/10 89  19/10 99 
11/11  59t  13/11  69t  15/11  79t  17/11  89!  19/11  99! 
49 Banking and 
Accounting table 
The Whole New Penny 
Conversion Table 
Old 
£sd 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1/-
1/1 
1/2 
1/3 
1/4 
1/5 
New 
£p 
0 
1 
1 
2 
z 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
7 
1/6  7 
1/7  8 
1/8  8 
i/9  9 
1/10  9 
1/11  10 
To convert a sum of money, first 
convert the largest even number of 
shillings (multiply by five). 
Then convert the remainder (this 
will be an amount between 1  d 
and 1  s 11 d) in accordance with 
this table and add the two 
amounts together. 
To convert [32 4s 6d, the steps 
are: 
£32  remains  £32 
4s  becomes  20p 
6d  becomes  3p 
so  £32  4s  6d  becomes  £32 · 23 
But, to convert £32 5s 6d, the steps 
are: 
£32  rema1ns  £32 
4s  becomes  20p 
1  s  6d  becomes  7p 
so  £32 5s  6d  becomes  £32 · 27 
Similarly 
£32 14s  6d  becomes  £32 ·73 
and 
£32  15s  6d  becomes  £32-77 
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